The Great Game Continues – Exclusive

(Dr Sachithanandam Sathananthan) 

The widely expected victory for Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader Asif Ali Zardari in the presidential election brought to a high point the tortuous process of regime change in Pakistan. Anyone who has followed the “colour revolutions” that installed pro-American rulers in Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange

Revolution, 2004) and Kyrgystan (Tulip Revolution, 2005) could surely not have missed the tell tale signs.

The earliest foreboding surfaced in the backroom manoeuvres by United States (US) and British intelligence services to engineer panic about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. It was a repeat of the duplicitous hysteria they generated over non-existent weapons of mass destruction that Iraq allegedly possessed. A carefully worded article, co-authored by former State Department officials Richard L. Armitage and Kara L. Bue, signalled the shift in US policy. After formally acknowledging then President Pervez Musharraf’s many achievements, the authors continued: “much remains to be accomplished, particularly in terms of democratization. Pakistan must…eliminate the home-grown jihadists…And…it must prove itself a reliable partner on technology transfer and nuclear non-proliferation.” And the denouement: “We believe General Musharraf…deserves our attention and support, no matter how frustrated we become at the pace of political change and the failure to eliminate Taliban fighters on the Afghan border.” Translation: Musharraf has to go.

Almost simultaneously a 2006 country survey in The Economist, titled “Too much for one man to do”, began on a jingoistic overkill: “Think about Pakistan, and you might get terrified. Few countries have so much potential to cause trouble, regionally and worldwide”. The following year a Carnegie Endowment report faulted western governments that “contribute to regional instability by allowing Pakistan to trade democratisation for its cooperation on terrorism”. Senior US State Department officials repeatedly accused Musharraf of “not doing enough” to combat Islamists within Pakistan and prevent their infiltration across the Durand Line into southern Afghanistan.

Sensing the way wind was blowing, then PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto redoubled efforts to convince Washington and London that, if she were to become Prime Minister, she would gladly do their bidding. She underscored her enthusiasm to serve and ensured her party was fully responsive to America’s Late Neo-colonialism. She summoned senior party members to Dubai on 9 June 2007 for a “briefing” by a team from the US Democratic Party’s National Democratic Institute (NDI), ostensibly on the subject of elections in Pakistan. The ruling Republican Party’s International Republican Institute (IRI) had conducted the previous four “briefings” in June and September 2006 and March and April 2007.

Benazir leaned towards the Democratic Party in the last one no doubt as a hedge against the party’s possible victory at the forthcoming US Presidential Election.

Even a cursory knowledge of US Imperialism’s standard operating procedure is sufficient to surmise at least some among the IRI and NDI officers were covert intelligence operatives; and that their “briefings” went beyond “tutelage of natives”. Rather they have been grooming the PPP as America’s satrap.

Benazir’s predilection to collaborate with the West has its roots in the Bhutto family’s micro political culture. Her grandfather, Shah Nawaz Bhutto was a minor comprador official in the British colonial regime. The British rewarded his “loyal” services with the title Khan Bahadur and later appointed him President of a District Board and still later elevated him to knighthood. Her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populist programmes did not dilute that legacy, which left a lasting impression on Benazir; she firmly believed the path to political power in Pakistan meanders through the Embassy of the United States, the current neo-colonialist.

She promised to offer the International Atomic Energy Agency access to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan to “satisfy the international community”, an euphemism for the major powers; and to allow the US-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan to operate inside north-western Pakistan. By the time Benazir visited the Senate in September 2007, she had convinced the Bush Administration of her unswerving loyalty; for “she received a standing ovation from a select gathering of US lawmakers, diplomats, academics and media representatives. This contrasted sharply with her previous visits to the US capital when she received little attention.” To deepen “Washington’s renewed interest in her” Benazir cautioned that supporting Musharraf was “a strategic miscalculation” and pleaded “the US should support the forces of democracy”, which, of course, refers to her PPP.

So, President George W Bush enabled Benazir’s return from exile by arm-twisting Musharraf to promulgate the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The NRO of 5 October granted amnesty to politicians active in Pakistan between 1988 and 1999 and effectively wiped the slate clean of corruption charges for Benazir and her husband Asif Zardari. Three weeks later Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made it appear the Bush Administration wished to bring together “moderate” forces, implying a scenario in which Musharraf and Benazir would join forces as President and Prime Minister respectively; and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte corroborated Rice: “Our message”, he intoned, “is that we want to work with the government and people of Pakistan”.

However, Musharraf saw through the US Administration’s transparent ploy to lull him into believing it would not remove him and install Benazir in his place. So, he swiftly invited Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), back from exile in Saudi Arabia to counter Benazir. But he could not consolidate his position, especially because he mishandled the judiciary, and was compelled to resign on 18 August 2008.

In a nutshell, the reason for “Washington’s renewed interest” in Benazir is Musharraf’s firm opposition to US Late Neo-colonialism, to its manoeuvres to occupy, pacify and ravage Pakistan. In the 19th century British colonialism waged the “war on piracy” on the high seas ostensibly to bring “the light of Christian civilization”. But the British were the most successful pirates, as Spanish and Portuguese historians would gladly confirm. The “war on piracy” was the duplicitous justification trotted out to dominate lucrative maritime trade routes that were in the hands of Chinese, Arab and Tamil maritime empires and to invade kingdoms and/or countries essential to control trade and plunder resources. During most of the 20th century heroic anti-colonial movements and anti-imperialist wars rolled back much of colonial rule, which in some instances however morphed into neo-colonialism. Indonesia after Sukarno, Iran after Mosaddeq and Chile after Allende are well known examples.

The “war on terror” and “promoting democracy” are the 21st century equivalents of the 19th century British gobbledygook. American Late Neo-colonialism purveys them as moral justification and uses as political cover for intervening and, where necessary, invading resource-rich and strategic countries to overthrow nationalist leaders, install puppet regimes and savage the countries’ wealth. And of course the US is by far the most powerful terrorist force. It succeeded in Iraq (for now); but the CIA-organised regime change could not dislodge Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, who rejected the neo-colonialist 1989 Washington Consensus and supported alternative nationalist economic models.

Politically challenged Pakistani liberals — a motley crowd that includes members of human rights and civil liberties organisations, journalists, analysts, lawyers and assorted professionals — are utterly incapable of comprehending the geo-strategic context in which Musharraf manoeuvred to defend Pakistan’s interest. So they slandered him an “American puppet”, alleging he caved in to US pressure and withdrew support to the Afghan Taliban regime in the wake of 9/11 although in fact he removed one excuse for the Bush Administration to “bomb Pakistan into stone age”, as a senior State Department official had threatened.

Nevertheless American discomfort with Musharraf’s government was palpable by late 2003, after he dodged committing Pakistani troops to prop up the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. When he offered to cooperate under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), naïve Pakistani media and analysts lunged for his jugular, condemning him once again for succumbing to US demands. But in fact he nimbly sidestepped American demands: he calculated that diverse ideological stances of the 57 Muslim member-counties would not allow the OIC to jointly initiate such controversial action and therefore Pakistan’s participation cannot arise, which proved correct.

Washington of course was not amused and the Bush Administration grew increasingly hostile to Musharraf’s determination to prioritise Pakistan’s interests when steering the ship of the state through the choppy waters of the unfolding New Great Game, in which the West — led by the US — is manoeuvring to contain growing Russian and Chinese influences in Central and West Asia. His foreign policy decisions over time convinced Washington that under his leadership, Pakistan would side with enemies of US and Britain in the New Great Game. First, he refused to isolate Iran; instead he vigorously pursued energy cooperation to build the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline in the face of stiff American opposition. Second, Washington was alarmed by Musharraf’s preference for deepening Pakistan-China bilateral relations and forging nuclear cooperation; and more so when he offered Beijing naval facilities at the Gwadar port on Balochistan’s Arabian Sea coast overlooking the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint through which passes approximately 30 per cent of world’s energy supplies.

Perhaps the last straw was his success in gaining Observer Status for Pakistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia and China are spearheading the SCO, which includes four other countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Iran and India are also Observers. The SCO is widely perceived as a rising eastern counterweight to western security and economic groupings and Islamabad drifting towards the SCO was simply unacceptable in Washington.

To rub salt into its wounds, Musharraf refused permission to interrogate Dr AQ Khan and firmly rejected Washington’s demands that NATO troops be allowed into the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to hunt down Osama bin Laden and his associates.

By early 2006 it was clear Washington was looking for nothing less than a pliable leader in Islamabad, a firm political foothold in Pakistan and a Pakistani foreign policy that complemented US strategic aims in Central Asia.

What perhaps angered Washington the most were actions Musharraf took to wind down the “war on terror” within Pakistan. Immediately after taking power, he outlawed three Islamic extremist groups and, after 9/11, intensified military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.

Washington would have gone along with Musharraf had he focussed on military operations to curb Islamists. Military action alone cannot defeat guerrillas; but it can kill many of them and in turn induce new recruits — well known points reiterated by William R Polk in Violent Politics (2007) – so that the so-called “war on terror” would not end any time soon.

That could supplement US Administrations’ assiduous manufacture of the “Islamic threat” through the 1990s to launch an endless “war on terror” — the New Cold War — to rescue America’s permanent war economy. For after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US economy (and by extension west European economies) faced perhaps its biggest crisis: the “Communist threat” ceased to be credible; it could not be exploited to terrify the American people into acquiescing to rising military expenditure that keeps wheels of the permanent war economy rolling and to expanding the repressive security apparatuses.

So the Bush Administration deftly replaced the “Communist threat” with the “Islamic threat”, no doubt following Machiavelli’s famous advice in The Prince, that a wise ruler invents enemies and then slays them in order to control his own subjects. The apparently counterproductive bombings, arrests, torture, kidnappings and disappearances (sanitised as Extraordinary Rendition) carried out by US forces while the CIA covertly funded, armed and supported Islamists are intended not to eliminate the “Islamic threat” but to contain it within manageable limits and to spawn the next generation of “terrorists”.

Sometimes, plans go awry; “culling” may not contain the resistance, as seen in Afghanistan from time to time. Nevertheless, the strategy is to “feed terrorism” and simultaneously “cull terrorists” so that the perpetual New Cold War oils America’s moribund permanent war economy.

Musharraf, however, did not play ball. He complemented military force to defeat Islamists with political initiatives.

He signed a peace treaty with tribal elders in North Waziristan (within FATA) to marginalise the Islamists. To combat the Islamists’ religious ideology, he promoted “enlightened moderation”, a veiled reference to secularism and tolerance. Musharraf’s vision of a secular Pakistan has its roots in exposure to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s legacy when he attended school in Ankara during his father’s diplomatic posting to Turkey. In fact, after taking power in Pakistan he often held up Ataturk as his role model. He planned to “wean away” the people from the “extremists” through education is how he described his approach to this writer. Towards this end, he introduced educational reforms and re-wrote school history text books; enacted laws protecting women’s rights and diluted Islamic laws against women; and he liberalised the media. To deny Islamists their traditional rallying cry — Kashmir — he opened path breaking negotiations with India to remove that arrow from the Islamists’ quiver.

When Musharraf skilfully combined military operations against Islamists with a political front promoting secularism to ideologically disarm them, the US administration saw red. By secularising Pakistani society over time Musharraf would de-fang the “Islamic threat” within Pakistan and extricate the country out of the contrived orbit of “war on terror”. That would greatly diminish Washington’s leverage to intervene in the country to distance Islamabad from Beijing and exploit energy resources abundantly found in Balochistan and, in the long run, perhaps derail US administration’s well laid plans to bring Afghanistan to heel and to dominate Central Asia and its oil-rich Caspian Sea basin.

But Musharraf was in no mood to back down. So the Bush Administration slipped regime change into gear. Taking advantage of his missteps, the anti-Musharraf media blitz, NGO and student mobilisations, lawyers agitations, protests by political parties and civil society organisations seemingly coming from all directions in fact displayed a fantastic degree of organisation, coordination and financing clearly beyond the ken of the fratricidal activists and often ad hoc institutions and never witnessed before in the country. Very likely they will not be seen again either; indeed later the activists were singularly incapable of organising any significant agitation when three women were buried alive for defying their parents’ choice of husbands. The manoeuvres against Musharraf bear uncanny resemblances to organised “people’s power” the CIA unleashed during “colour revolutions” and upheavals against Hugo Chavez.

The Bush Administration began reaping the rewards of unseating Musharraf within 24 hours of his resignation. Chief of Army Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani travelled to Kabul to meet NATO and Afghan commanders on 19 August. About 10 days later Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen informed a Pentagon news conference on 28 August that Kayani and his lieutenants held a “secret meeting” with their US counterparts on a US aircraft carrier, reminiscent of American gun boat diplomacy in Latin America and unthinkable in Pakistan under Musharraf’s watch..

Mullen touchingly chronicled how he “learned to trust” Kayani and bent over backwards to emphasise that Kayani is no American puppet, that Kayani’s “principles and goals are to do what’s best for Pakistan.” But a few sections of the US media, weaned on decades of Pentagon-speak from the debacle in Vietnam to the illegal invasion of Iraq, saw through the verbal obfuscation. And when a reporter pointedly queried Mullen whether Kayani’s “goal for Pakistan also aligned a hundred per cent with the US goal”, the Admiral waffled: “[Kayani] knows his country a whole lot better than we do. And again, I just think that’s where he is, that’s where he’ll stay.” Translation: US administration has got Kayani on tight leash.

And to maintain there is no substantial change from Musharraf’s policies, Kayani’s spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas and Mullen alleged the meetings had been arranged several weeks earlier, when Musharraf was President, to facetiously imply he had approved the contacts.

The import of “coordination” between American, NATO, Afghan and Pakistan militaries will become clearer over the next weeks and months. For now the suspicion is unavoidable that the US Administration has at long last begun frog-marching Pakistan into the US-created Afghan quagmire to further destabilise the country and justify intervention.

Musharraf had resolutely opposed precisely this eventuality. He rejected US demands that the Pakistani army assist NATO forces in Afghanistan. He underlined the country will not repeat the catastrophic mistakes of the 1980s when it got embroiled in America’s war in Afghanistan against the then Soviet Union, for which the Pakistani people continues to pay a heavy price. Rather, he insisted his army will fight only Pakistan’s war within Pakistan’s borders.

The consequences of the PPP leadership following the US into the Afghan quagmire will soon be evident.

Already, within 16 days of Musharraf’s resignation, US forces carried out the first ground assault in Angoor Adda area within Pakistan’s borders — which Musharraf had disallowed — with the connivance of the new leadership. Obviously there is more to come since the Bush Administration has eagerly caricatured the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as “The New Frontier” in the New Cold War.

For the moment, there is great euphoria among Pakistani liberals over the presumed “return to democracy”. The comments by Ayesha Tanmy Haq are typical: “We have removed a dictator by the citizenry showing that real power lies with them.” The hapless liberals have yet to discover Late Neo-colonialism and its devious manoeuvres for regime change; they have in fact effectively legitimised them by opposing Musharraf. They are agonisingly unaware of the labyrinthine geo-politics and economic imperatives underlying the New Cold War. They are blissfully going along with the collaborationist leaders who are bartering away the country’s future for the proverbial pieces of silver.

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Dr Sachithanandam Sathananthan read for the Ph D degree at the University of Cambridge and was Visiting Research Scholar at the Jawaharlal Nehru University School of International Studies.

(Source: Outlook India)

Manmohan Singh, Musharraf came close to striking Kashmir’s solution: WikiLeaks

NEW DELHI: India and Pakistan had through “back channels” agreed to a non-territorial solution to Kashmir under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, reveals a latest WikiLeaks cable. According to the US embassy cable – dated April 21, 2009 – Singh confirmed this to a visiting US delegation, led by then House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Howard Berman in April, 2009, saying that the solution included free trade and movement across LoC.

Singh told the US delegation that Delhi and Islamabad had made great progress prior to February 2007, when President Musharraf ran into trouble. “We had reached an understanding in back channels,” he related, says the cable, in which Musharraf had agreed to a non-territorial solution to Kashmir. Singh went on to add that India wanted a strong, stable, peaceful, democratic Pakistan and makes no claim on “even an inch” of Pakistani territory.

Singh’s comments authenticate Musharraf’s assertions last year that India and Pakistan had reached that stage, where they were preparing the final draft for the resolution. He had said the two sides shared drafts through “back channels”, and these were in keeping with the four-point template which he had envisaged to resolve the issue. Singh, too, mentions in the cable that the two sides had arrived at the solution through back channels.

Musharraf’s four points included demilitarization, maximum autonomy, making border irrelevant and joint management of the area. Later, however, Pakistani government rejected the formula, saying that it was Musharraf’s personal line of thinking that lacked endorsement either by Pakistani parliament or cabinet. Singh, though, does not make any direct reference to Musharraf’s template in the WikiLeak cable. Musharraf had said, unlike in the case with PM Vajpayee, it was actually with Singh that Pakistan moved towards an agreement over the issue.

Reminding Berman and other US delegates that India had lost more than 150 of its citizens in the Mumbai attacks, Singh said it would be possible to resume dialogue only if Pakistan would “behave as a civilized country and bring the perpetrators to justice”. “Now, Pakistani leaders had to stick by commitments made to PM Vajpayee and repeated to PM Singh in 2005 that they would not permit attacks on India launched from Pakistani soil. If so, huge trade opportunities awaited, according to the Prime Minister, who added that a strong Indian constituency favoured normalized relations,” the cable says.

Recalling the July, 2008, attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, Singh asserted that it had been carried out “with the active encouragement” of Pakistan’s ISI and that he had raised the issue with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani.

Source: Times of India

9/11 – Could we have decided otherwise?

By Pervez Musharraf – former President of Pakistan

Pakistan’s decision to join the US and the Coalition in Afghanistan in their attack on the Taliban remains a subject of intense debate. This is the decision we took after a thorough, deliberate and realistic appraisal of the obtaining geo-strategic realities, but it has drawn criticism and praise alike. With the latest upsurge in terrorist activity in Pakistan, the debate on the post-9/11 response of Pakistan has intensified. I, therefore, thought it my duty to lay bare facts in front of the people of Pakistan, so that with all the necessary information they could judge the situation more accurately. The decision of my government was indeed based on, and in conformity with, my slogan of ‘Pakistan First’.

Some people suggested that we should oppose the United States and favour the Taliban. Was this, in any way, beneficial for Pakistan? Certainly not! Even if the Taliban and Al-Qaeda emerged victorious, it would not be in Pakistan’s interest to embrace obscurantist Talibanisation. That would have meant a society where women had no rights, minorities lived in fear and semi-literate clerics set themselves up as custodians of justice. I could have never accepted this kind of society for Pakistan. In any case, judging by military realities one was sure that the Taliban would be defeated. It would have been even more detrimental for Pakistan to be standing on the defeated side.

The United States, the sole superpower, was wounded and humiliated by the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorist attack. A strong retaliatory response against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was imminent.

I was angrily told, by the US, that Pakistan had to be ‘either with us or against us’. The message was also conveyed to me that ‘if Pakistan was against the United States then it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.’

This was the environment within which we had to take a critical decision for Pakistan. My sole focus was to make a decision that would benefit Pakistan in the long run, and also guard it against negative effects.

What options did the US have to attack Afghanistan? Not possible from the north, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Not from the west, through Iran. The only viable direction was from the east, through Pakistan. If we did not agree, India was ever ready to afford all support. A US-India collusion would obviously have to trample Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. Our airspace and land would have been violated. Should we then have pitched our forces, especially Pakistan Air Force, against the combined might of the US and Indian forces? India would have been delighted with such a response from us. This would surely have been a foolhardy, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests – our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause – would both have been irreparably compromised. We might even have put our very territorial integrity at stake.

The economic dimension of confronting the United States and the West also needed serious analysis. Pakistan’s major export and investment is to and from the United States and the European Union. Our textiles, which form 60 percent of our export and earnings, go to the West. Any sanctions on these would have crippled our industry and choked our economy. Workers would lose their jobs. The poor masses of Pakistan would have been the greatest sufferers.

China, our great friend, also has serious apprehensions about Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The upsurge of religious extremism emboldening the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in China is due to events in Afghanistan and the tribal agencies of Pakistan. China would certainly not be too happy with Pakistan on the side of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Even the Islamic Ummah had no sympathy for the Taliban regime; countries like Turkey and Iran were certainly against the Taliban. The UAE and Saudi Arabia – the only two countries other than Pakistan that had recognised the Taliban regime – had become so disenchanted with the Taliban that they had closed their missions in Kabul.

Here, I would also like to clear the notion that we accepted all the demands put forward by USA.

On September 13th 2001, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, brought me a set of seven demands. These demands had also been communicated to our Foreign Office by the US State Department.

1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for bin Laden.

2. Provide the United States with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.
3. Provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence as needed, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbour them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.
4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases, and internal security information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, its friends, or its allies.
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other terrorist acts against the United States or its friends and allies, and curb all domestic expressions of support [for terrorism] against the United States, its friends, or its allies.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers, en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
7.Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbour him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban, and assist the United States in the afore-mentioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.Some of these demands were ludicrous, such as “curb all domestic expressions of support [for terrorism] against the United States, its friends, and its allies.” How could my government suppress public debate, when I had been trying to encourage freedom of expression?

I also thought that asking us to break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan if it continued to harbour Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda was not realistic, because not only would the United States need us to have access to Afghanistan, at least until the Taliban fell, but such decisions are the internal affair of a country and cannot be dictated by anyone. But we had no problem with curbing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We had been itching to do so before the United States became its victim.

We just could not accept demands two and three. How could we allow the United States “blanket overflight and landing rights” without jeopardising our strategic assets? I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive areas. Neither could we give the United States “use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.” We refused to give any naval ports or fighter aircraft bases. We allowed the United States only two bases – Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh – and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no “blanket permission” for anything.

The rest of the demands we could live with. I am happy that the US government accepted our counterproposal without any fuss. I am shocked at the aspersion being cast on me: that I readily accepted all preconditions of the United States during the telephone call from Colin Powell. He did not give any conditions to me. These were brought by the US ambassador on the third day.

Having made my decision, I took it to the Cabinet. Then I began meeting with a cross section of society. Between September 18 and October 3, I met with intellectuals, top editors, leading columnists, academics, tribal chiefs, students, and the leaders of labour unions. On October 18, I also met a delegation from China and discussed the decision with them. Then I went to army garrisons all over the country and talked to the soldiers. I thus developed a broad consensus on my decision.

This was an analysis of all the losses/harms we would have suffered. if we had taken an anti-US stand. At the same time, I obviously analysed the socio-economic and military gains that would accrue from an alliance with the West. I have laid down the rationale for my decision in all its details. Even with hindsight, now, I do not repent it. It was correct in the larger interest of Pakistan. I am confident that the majority of Pakistanis agree with it.

Source: The Nation

Don’t Mess With Pakistan (Exclusive)

“Sporadic and superficial global support has made Pakistanis feel dangerously betrayed.” By General Pervez Musharraf – Former President of Pakistan

The world is watching Pakistan and rightfully so. It’s a happening place. Pakistan is at the center of geostrategic revolution and realignments. The economic, social, and political aspirations of China, Afghanistan, Iran, and India turn on securing peace, prosperity, and stability in Pakistan. Our country can be an agent of positive change, one that creates unique economic interdependencies between central, west and south Asian countries and the Middle East through trade and energy partnerships. Or there’s the other option: the borderless militancy Pakistan is battling could take down the whole region.

Recently, terrorists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border have plotted, unsuccessfully, to unleash terror as far away as Copenhagen and New York City. Pakistan’s role for a safe, secure world cannot be overemphasized. To appreciate the complex history of Pakistan’s internal and external challenges is to understand how the 21st century could well play out for the world.

Our country was born of violence, in August 1947. Just months after the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of the Dominion of Pakistan, we were at war with India over Kashmir. Pakistan and India’s mutual animosity and history of confrontation remain powerful forces in South Asia to this day. Because of its sense of having been wronged by India—and feeling that it faced an existential threat from that country—Pakistan cast its lot with the West. We became a strategic partner of the U.S. during the Cold War, signing on to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the 1950s, while India tilted toward the Soviet Union. As part of our inalienable right to self-preservation, we formulated a “minimum defensive deterrence” strategy to maintain Army, Navy and Air Force numbers at levels proportional to India’s.

In 1965 we again went to war over Kashmir, and in 1971 over East Pakistan (I fought in both). Our suspicions about India were proved right when it became clear that the creation of Bangladesh was only made possible through Indian military and intelligence support. Among Pakistanis in general, and the Army in particular, attitudes against India hardened. The adversarial relationship between our Inter Services Intelligence and their Research and Analysis Wing worsened, both exploiting any opportunity to inflict harm on the other.

Al Qaeda’s Internet outreach is not limited to the new magazine targeting, as it says, a “wide and dispersed English speaking Muslim readership.” Until earlier this month, the radicalizing sermons of American-Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki were readily available on YouTube, a popular video sharing Web site. Under pressure from British and American officials, it removed hundreds of al-Awlaki videos because they were an “incitement to commit violent acts.” The shutdown coincided with the sentencing in London of 21-year-old Roshonara Choudhury for a knife attack in May on a British legislator. The theology student said she had been converted by viewing some 5,000 of al-Awlaki’s online exhortations.

India’s “Smiling Buddha” nuclear tests in 1974 changed everything. Pakistan was forced to resort to unconventional means to compensate for the new imbalance of power. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated Pakistan’s atomic program, and thus began the nuclearization of the subcontinent. India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was an effort to project power beyond its borders; Pakistan’s was an existential and defensive imperative.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 presented Pakistan with a security threat from two directions: Soviets to the west, who wanted access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan, and Indians to the east. Once again Pakistan joined hands with the United States to fight Moscow.

We called it jihad by design, this effort to attract mujahideen from all over the Muslim world. And from Morocco to Indonesia, some 25,000 of them came. We trained and armed Taliban from the madrassahs of the then North West Frontier Province, and pushed them into Afghanistan. By this time, the liberal and intellectual Afghan elite had left for the safer climes of Europe and the U.S., leaving behind a largely poor, religious-minded population to fight the 10-year jihad. We—Pakistan, the U.S., the West, and Saudi Arabia—are equally responsible for nourishing the militancy that defeated the Soviet Union in 1989, and which seeks now to defeat us all.

The Soviets quit Kabul, and the Americans abandoned Islamabad. Washington rewarded its once indispensable ally by invoking the Pressler Amendment and imposing military sanctions, and by choosing to foster a strategic relationship with India. Pakistan was left alone to deal with the nearly 4 million Afghans who had streamed into our country and became the world’s largest refugee population. The people of Pakistan felt betrayed and used. For Pakistan, the decade of disaster had begun.

No efforts were made to deprogram, rehabilitate, and resettle the mujahideen or redevelop and build back war-ravaged Afghanistan. This shortsightedness led to ethnic fighting, warlordism, and Afghanistan’s dive into darkness. The mujahideen coagulated into Al Qaeda. The Taliban, who would emerge as a force in 1996, eventually would occupy 90 percent of the country, ramming through their obscurantist medievalism.

It was also in 1989 that the freedom struggle reignited in India-administered Kashmir. This started out as a purely indigenous and peaceful uprising against Indian state repression. The people who led this first intifada were radicalized by the Indian Army’s fierce and indiscriminate crackdowns on locals. The Kashmir cause is a rallying cry for Muslims around the world. It is more so for Pakistanis. The plight of Kashmiri Muslims inspired the creation of new mujahideen groups within Pakistan who then sent thousands of volunteer fighters to the troubled territory. In terms of identity politics, the boundaries were clearer: the mujahideen set their sights on India; Al Qaeda and the Taliban were focused largely on Afghanistan. With the Taliban to our west and the mujahideen in the north, this arc of anger rent our social fabric. Pakistan found itself awash in guns and drugs.

Nine years later, there was bad news from Pokhran. In May 1998, India again tested its bomb. Almost two weeks later, Pakistan responded by “turning the mountain white” at Chaghai. For Pakistanis, our own tests became a symbol of our power in the world, a testament to our resolve and innovation in the face of adversity, and a source of unmitigated pride in our streets. We became a nuclear power and an international pariah at the same time, but furthering and harnessing our nuclear potential remains and must remain our singular national interest. Of course, the U.S. views India’s nuclear program differently from Pakistan’s. Even our pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes, for electricity generation, is viewed negatively. India’s pursuit is assisted by the U.S. In Pakistan, people see this as yet another instance of American partiality, even hostility. Many even believe that the U.S. wants to denuclearize Pakistan— by force if necessary—because it fears the weapons could come into the hands of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or any of the myriad militant organizations who have loosed mayhem in Pakistan. Our nuclear weapons are secure.

Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan. We did this because of our ethnic, historical, and geographical affinity with Afghan Pashtuns who comprised the Taliban. In 2000, when I led Pakistan, I had suggested to the U.S. and other countries that they, too, should recognize the Taliban government and collectively engage Kabul in order to achieve moderation there through exposure and exchange. This was shot down. Continued diplomatic isolation of the Taliban regime pushed it into the embrace of the Arab-peopled Al Qaeda. Had the Taliban government been recognized, the world could have saved the Bamiyan Buddhas, and unknotted the Osama bin Laden problem thereby preventing the spate of Al Qaeda-orchestrated attacks around the world including on September 11, 2001, in the U.S.

When America decided to retaliate, we joined the international coalition against Kabul by choice so we could safeguard and promote our own national interests. Nobody in Islamabad was in favor of the religious and governmental philosophy of the Taliban. By joining the coalition, we also prevented India from gaining an upper hand in Afghanistan from where it could then machinate against Pakistan. The Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated in 2001 with the help of the Northern Alliance, which was composed of Uzbeks, Hazarans, and Tajiks—all ethnic minorities. The Pashtuns and Arabs of Afghanistan fled to the mountains and fanned out across Pakistan. This was the serious downside of joining the global coalition: the mujahideen who were fighting for Kashmir formed an unholy nexus with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban—and turned their guns on us. While I was president, they made at least four attempts on my life.

In 2002, the allies installed a largely Pashtun-free government in Afghanistan that lacked legitimacy because it did not represent 50 percent of the Afghan population, Pashtuns. This should not have happened. All Taliban are Pashtun, but not all Pashtuns are Taliban. Pashtuns were thus isolated, blocked from the mainstream, and pushed toward the Taliban, who made a resurgence in 2004.

Today, the Taliban rule the roost in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are ensconced in our tribal agencies, plotting and launching attacks against us and others. The twin scourge of radicalism and militarism has infected settled districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and beyond. Mujahideen groups are operating in India-administered Kashmir and seem to have public support in Pakistan.

After nine long years, and a longer war for the U.S. than Vietnam, the world wants to negotiate with “moderate” elements in the Taliban—and from a position of apparent weakness. Before the coalition abandons Afghanistan again, it must at least ensure the election of a legitimate Pashtun-led government. Pakistan, which has lost at least 30,000 of its citizens in the war on terror, should be forgiven for wondering whether it was all worth it. Pakistanis should not be left to feel that it was not.

Source: Newsweek Pakistan

To comment on this article, email  letters@newsweek.pk

Saudi King Representative meets Nawaz: reminded of agreement

LONDON: Representative of Saudi King Abdullah met with PML-N Chief nawaz Sharif in London for three hours in which he once again relate the message to abide by the agreement made during the tenure of former President Pervez Musharraf.

Sources told that three days before a representative of Saudi King Abdullah met with Nawaz Sharif in a luxurious hotel in the UK during which the message of the Saudi King was conveyed by asking Nawaz Sharif to abide by his agreement for not participating in politics till 20th December, 2010 and also not to indulge in any talk against former President Musharraf.

Due to this agreement, Nawaz Sharif has not made any new statement against former president in or outside the country.

PML Sources told that Nawaz Sharif does not want to be in the bad books of Saudi King Abdullah hence want to spend the remaining two months of his agreement peacefully.

Sources say that Nawaz Sharif had expressed his sheer desire to meet Saudi King Abdullah after coming back from London but the latter in a message refused saying that he will call him (Nawaz) when he wants.

It must be worthwhile mentioning that Saudi Arabia is fuming and annoyed with Sharif Brothers over participation of Mian Shahbaz Sharif in elections thus Mian Nawaz refrain from by-elections in view to avoid putting fuel on fire.

On the other hand, when Media Coordinator of the PML-N Asim Khan was contacted he was of a clear-cut stance that he is not aware of the Representative of Saudi King Abdullah meeting with PML-N Chief Mian Nawaz Sharif in London urging Pervez Musharraf is not a big politician thus brushing aside some of the allegations on the twice Prime Minister of Pakistan thick and thin.

Source: Pak Tribune

Pervez Musharraf’s achievements for Pakistan – a short review

Real Life Drama in the Air (Remembering 12th October, 1999)

October, 1999 Capt Sarwat of Pakistan International Airlines Airbus-300, an old buddy, and I had gone to Colombo, Sri Lanka for Airlanka Golf classic tournament. On the 10th October, after returning from the 18th hole (towards the finish of the game) that I saw General Pervez Musharraf (chief of Joint staff and Chief of the army staff) teeing- off with the Bangladeshi COAS for a friendly match. Gen Musharraf had gone to Colombo to represent Pakistan on the 50th anniversary of Sri Lankan armed forces. On the 12th October we were to return back to Pakistan and our flight route was Colombo-Male (Maldives)–Karachi. The flight time between Male and Karachi was almost three and a half hours. Capt. Sarwat was Commander of the flight PK/805 and I was traveling as a passenger in the club class but being cockpit crew of PIA I could visit the cockpit with the consent of the Capt. of the flight. The First officer of the flight was Mr. Shami {who was on his first clearance check flight to Sri Lanka} and the flight engineer Mr. Amir.

Gen Pervez Musharraf boarded the plane with his wife and two of his personal staff officers. Gen. Musharraf and his wife were seated in the front extreme right hand side seats and the PSO’s occupied the last two seats on the same side. There were a total of 198 persons aboard that flight out of which almost 50 were children from the American school with six foreign teachers. The flight to Male was bumpy due to rain and clouds. At Male, which was a transit stop, Gen. Musharraf, his wife and the PSO’s disembarked to see the strange looking island which had nothing but just a runway strip. At Male, Capt. Sarwat after getting the weather information of Karachi and Nawabshah decided to refuel the aircraft, keeping Nawabshah airfield as an alternative (Nawabshah airfield is almost 110 nautical miles north east of Karachi). It meant that the aircraft could reach Karachi and in contingency could divert to Nawabshah and keep flying in air for another 45 minutes before landing at Nawabshah which is normally the fuel policy of the airlines throughout the world.

The departure from Male was uneventful. The airplane started cruising at 29000 feet, I was sitting in the cockpit jump seat and occasionally would stand up to stretch and walk in the cabin. During the flight, the air guards and the cabin crew requested Gen Pervez Musharraf for individual and group photographs. Capt Sarwat also came to the club class from the cockpit to greet the VIP.

After two and half hours of flight and now cruising at 33000 feet, we established contact with Karachi air traffic controller. The first thing the Karachi radio controller asked was how much fuel was on board? What was our alternate airfield? And how many passengers were on board? I was standing behind the flight Engineer’s seat and listening to the whole conversation through the cockpit speakers. On hearing this I did point out to Capt. Sarwat “Isn’t it strange for Karachi to be asking this?” to which he nodded “yes”. It was a clear night and probably the third of moon was out but we could later on see Karachi very clearly. The initial approach given to us was direct Marvi (shortest route) but after a while Karachi changed the clearance via Nansi (the longer route) and gave us descent clearance to 10000 ft.

As the airplane reached almost within 60 miles the Karachi tower said “PK /805 you are not cleared to land at Karachi”.“Can we proceed to Nawabshah?” Capt Sarwat asked ATC after pondering for a little while as to what must be going on down below. “Nawabshah is also closed” came the reply. “But Nawabshah is our alternate!” said Capt Sarwat forcefully. Karachi ATC said “you will land at your own risk you cannot land in Pakistan. All airfields are closed”. “We do not have fuel for any other airfield!” Capt. Sarwat replied but once again but there was complete silence from the ATC.

The Karachi ATC was questioned thrice but all in vain —- there was no answer. During the ATC conversation it seemed quite obvious that someone behind the controller was passing the instruction because more than three or more persons could be heard in the background of the reception. A KLM flight which was somewhere in air and listening to this conversation also shouted, “Karachi why don’t you give the reason to the PK 805″. While the commotion was on, Capt Sarwat assumed that perhaps it may be due to the VIP sitting aboard. Sarwat knowing my air force background asked me and the other crew “Partner what do you think, should I tell the general about this?” I butted in and said why not, let’s get whatever help we can!” Capt called the purser and asked him to inform the personal staff officers of the general. Both the PSO’s were informed and they came rushing into the cockpit. After listening to the Capt. they went to inform the General. Meanwhile Capt Sarwat asked the flight engineer as to how much fuel was left, and if we could make it to Muscat. “No way, we have only five and a half tons of fuel left at this 10000 feet altitude” he calculated. Meanwhile General Musharraf had entered the cockpit. During the discussion between the flight crew members, two other alternate airfields for diversion were considered. Chahbahar in Iran and Ahmedabad in India. After a little discussion with the flight engineer regarding remaining fuel and new airfield and night landing facility, Chahbahar was not considered as an alternate airfield. “Do we have the approach and landing information on Ahmedabad? Please open and consult Jeppesen (the flight crew bible} immediately” Sarwat asked the co-pilot.

General Musharraf was listening to the conversation and he asserted “We will not go to India, that is not an option”, to which Capt Sarwat said “okay General as you say.” Now the Gen said that he wanted to talk to the Corp commander Karachi, immediately. After a while the PSO gave the mobile telephone number to the flight engineer and wrote the land telephone number of the Corp. Commander. Karachi.

The flight engineer Amir tried many times to dial the telephone but there was no dial tone. In this hurry and in presence of the general, the flight engineer mishandled his flash light and broke its glass. The flight engineer Amir said we are not getting the connection through and it seems as if the telephone lines have been cut. The general then asked as to why we couldn’t speak on the long range radio- the high frequency. The flight engineer tried to establish contact through company high frequency phone patch but it was all quiet, and no answer was received.

The other airplanes flying in Karachi vicinity were instructed by the Karachi ATC to divert because Karachi airport was closed. An aircraft of Pakistan Air Force which was in inbound to Karachi from Islamabad was instructed by the Karachi air traffic controller to land at Nawabshah, immediately. But the PAF Captain was not willing to accept this order and asserted that the PAF flight would go back to Islamabad. While the argument between the PAF aircraft and Karachi ATC were going on the Capt Sarwat changed the radio frequency. However later on I investigated about the PAF flight and I found out that it was a Boeing 737 VIP aircraft, which was on routine maintenance trip to Karachi but was forced to land at Nawabshah airfield. The police at Nawabshah, with special instructions was waiting for the two engine jet aircraft. Since it is difficult for a common man to distinguish between a Boeing 737 and an Airbus A-300, therefore Nawabshah police cordoned off the aircraft after parking. But as the doors were opened Pakistani Army soldiers rushed to the aircraft and shouted at the police to buzz off otherwise they would be shot at. The Police dispersed and now the army took charge of the aircraft.

An Army officer entered the aircraft. To their dismay, they found the wife and children of the PAF Capt sitting inside, “Where is the General?” inquired the army officer. “What General?” asked the crew? PAF crew told them that they were going to Karachi from Islamabad. “But we were told that you are coming from Colombo” said the officer surprised In the air at the very same time, the first officer of the aircraft saw two blips on traffic collision avoidance system and shouted “We are being intercepted; probably there are two fighter aircraft”. The conversation in the cockpit our plane had become tense and was blended with other actions in the cockpit, which had become rather twice demanding. I noticed that at no point any of the crew or the VIP lost their cool. The general insisted several times that we land at Karachi. He also inquired as to why we couldn’t land at the air force runways at Karachi. But probably due to the fighter aircraft and no knowledge as to what was happening below on ground, with no runway lights landing at PAF Airfields was considered as the last option. If we could not land at Karachi or at Nawabshah due to runway blockade with tractors and bulldozers etc then Shahrah-e-Faisal or Masroor was the last option anyways. At this point Capt Sarwat changed to PIA company radio channel. Sarwat was asked about the remaining fuel. Someone at the company channel directed PK805 to proceed and land at Nawabshah, then refuel the airplane with 30 tones of fuel and once again get airborne and wait for further instructions. After a few minutes, the Karachi ATC came on air and cleared PK805 to divert to Nawabshah. . Capt Sarwat then heaved a sigh of relief and said “Let’s go to Nawabshah”. The Airbus climbed like a missile to 20000 feet in no time since there was hardly any fuel left in the aircraft and it was rather light. At about 60 miles north of Karachi PK805 was redirected to come and land at Karachi by the Karachi ATC. A quick turnabout and descent was initiated. Someone from the ATC asked to speak to the general. Capt Sarwat gave his microphone to the general and said, “Sir please speak”.

“This is Pervez Musharraf, who is there?” the general inquired very assertively. “I am Gen. Iftikhar sir, your retirement was announced two hours before but we are in control. Please land at Karachi “Where is the Corp Commander?” the general questioned “He is in the next room waiting for you “was the reply. Both the PSO’s were listening and the younger PSO (a Major) said” Sir, ask him the name of his dog”. Probably he wanted to be sure in recognizing the GOC, but the general who had kept his cool all along said confidently, “He is my man, don’t worry!”(Later on this officer on ground happened to be a friend of mine who told me that General Musharraf had given him two puppies and that’s how the PSO wanted to determine his identity) Meanwhile he plane was reaching for its final approach. Suddenly the low fuel warning light of right wing fuel tank came on with an audio chime. The cockpit was dead silent and everyone was waiting to feel the touchdown as soon as possible. We had waited almost one hour and ten minutes in the air. The remaining fuel of 1.2 ton in the wing tanks, if reliable, was only available for approximately ten minutes of flight time. At twelve miles short of landing, the left wing fuel tank warning light also appeared with chime.

After touch down PK 805 was asked to park at the remote area (Bay 66) and was informed that no other person than the VIP will come out of the aircraft. After the engines shut down, the army soldiers who were almost two hundred cordoned-off the aircraft. The General was looking from the cockpit window and seemed relaxed. Before disembarking from the aircraft the general shook hands with all of us and said, “Thank you, don’t worry all is well, he’s my man.” And he immediately passed his very first order through his PSO, “Tell them I don’t want anyone to leave the country.”

The General, his wife, who was trying to control her tears, and the two PSO’s disembarked from the plane and were greeted by the Corp. Commander and the GOC with salutes from the soldiers. They all went inside a building for a short conference, which took almost 15 min after which the whole contingent drove away very fast. PK805 was not allowed to start the engines perhaps because of the security and almost no remaining fuel and was thus towed to the international arrival side (Bay 23). During the whole episode I was the quietest and the closest observer in the cockpit and was thoroughly impressed to watch total professionalism from Capt Sarwat and his crew. Not to mention the way General carried himself and remained confident and totally composed throughout the whole episode.

Source: The Pakistani Spectator

Kashmir could have been resolved had Musharraf continued as Pak President: Jethmalani

Houston, July 7 (ANI): Indian Supreme Court Bar Association (ISCBA) President and Kashmir Committee Chairman Ram Jethmalani has disclosed that the Kashmir issue could have been resolved peacefully if former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf had remained in power for a little longer.

Jethmalani said that Musharraf was at the brink of resolving Kashmir issue before being destabilized by political turmoil in Pakistan, which derailed the process.

“It is no longer a secret now that president Musharraf sent us a document carrying acceptable recommendations and proposals for solution of Kashmir Issue for two sides,” The News quoted Jethmalani, as saying.

“Subsequently, I myself, worked on those proposals being chairman of Kashmir Committee, made slight changes and produced them before mass representatives, but time did not permit Musharraf,” he added.

Jethmalani said this after attending a convention hosted by Sindhi Association of North America (SANA) in Houston, Texas.

Source: Daily India

Who won Kargil War?

President Musharraf (2007) vs ‘Elected Democracy’ (2009) – A comparison

“President Musharraf (2007) vs ‘Elected Democracy’ (2009) -  A comparison” as given by ‘Kamran Khan Show’ on 09th february 2010