Archive for the ‘Nawaz Sharif Exposed’ Category


An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999

February 5, 2013

(Written by Shaukat Qadir – A retired soldier from the Pakistan army, the founder and Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and now works as an independent analyst.)

“The purpose of deterrence is to deter”

VajpayeeIn May 1998 India tested its nuclear weapons, and Pakistan, despite the halfhearted attempts of the international community to prevent it, soon followed suit. Many analysts viewed this development as dangerous. Almost an equally large number felt that it was for the best, however, since this brought deterrence fully into place. It was not long before the latter were rudely shocked out of their assessment.

In February 1999, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, visited Pakistan as part of the much touted ‘bus diplomacy’, on the invitation of his counterpart, Mr Nawaz Sharif. Vajpayee was greeted with great pomp and show, unaware that Kargil had been (or was being) occupied. In early May 1999, the Indian army learnt that intruders had occupied the heights close to the Dras region in Kashmir. A patrol of ten soldiers sent to investigate was wiped out. Over the next few days the Indian army, without yet reporting to their political leadership (as any other army would do), proceeded to first attempt the eviction of the intruders and, on failing to do so, assess the extent of their intrusion. At some point they went to the political leadership to inform them of the intrusion. The event led to a military takeover in Pakistan and sent shock waves round the world. And according to some analysts, it almost led to a nuclear war. It is still too early to assess the final outcome of the event. For Vajpayee, this was a particularly un-propitious moment in time  he was heading an interim government, coming up for re-election in a few months, and, following a courageous trip to Lahore, in the teeth of opposition from all his colleagues.

Let me state at the outset that, while I have considerable knowledge of the course of events (pieced together from private discussions with friends and colleagues in positions of authority, who played a role), I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, quite obviously, any input from the Indian side. There is, therefore, some conjecture in what follows. Only the actual actors will be able to judge the accuracy of this conjecture. That said, this analysis is based on my (not inconsiderable) personal knowledge of: the terrain around Kargil; the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army; the decision making process in the Pakistan army (in which I served in numerous command and staff assignments); and the collective character of the Pakistan army (on which basis I also judge the Indian army, being essentially no different).


When the British finally decided to leave India in 1947, the ‘Princely States’ were given the freedom to decide their own fate. They could join either of the two new states created by partition, India and Pakistan, or opt for independence. Junagarh, a predominantly Hindu state, with a Muslim ruler, opted for Pakistan, but was forcibly occupied by India on the principle that the population was predominantly Hindu. Hyderabad chose independence, but was again forced into the Indian Union. The territories that formed the state of Jammu and Kashmir were governed by a Sikh ruler, who kept delaying his decision until 1948, when finally some tribal lashkars (a loosely grouped force) decided to intervene on behalf of their Muslim brethren. He then announced his accession to India over the radio, and Indian troops were air lifted into Kashmir (reinforcing those already there), ostensibly to defend the Maharaja (Prince). Interestingly, India claims that the Maharajah also signed the document of accession, although no one has ever seen the document.

Indian troops moved into the valley of Srinagar and managed to evict the lashkars, where they established what was later to be called the Line of Control (LOC). Despite lobbying by India, the United Nations unanimously passed a resolution in favor of self determination for the people of Kashmir. Jawaharal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, accepted the resolution and promised to abide by it, but later reneged. Kashmir became ‘disputed territory’, divided into Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) and Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K, or AK), as the Pakistanis came to refer to them. Pakistan and India have fought three wars. Of these, two were fought over Kashmir, in 1948 and 1965, when Pakistan attempted to liberate the people of Kashmir. The 1971 war was imposed by India, to liberate East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Kashmir has been the site of numerous mini-wars between the two countries, which have constantly sought to take advantage of the other’s perceived vulnerabilities. Since India occupied the vacant heights at Siachin glacier in 1984, there has been an annual exchange at what is the highest battleground in the world. Pakistan too, has seized every opportunity to gain an advantage. Kargil was, in fact, on the Pakistani side of the LOC until 1971, when the Indians evicted Pakistani troops in a surprise attack.

The Terrain

The terrain around Kargil is amongst the most beautiful in the world. It is also amongst the most difficult to conduct military operations in. The Kargil mini war was fought over an area extending from Dras to Kargil and Batalik, an area spanning about a hundred kilometers in length. Craggy peaks abound the region range in height from 13000 feet t 18000 feet, with the floor of the valleys at around 7000 feet. Each crest line is followed by another, with ravines in between, and there are frequent depressions (even along the crest line of one continuous feature), which could range from a few hundred feet in depth to a few thousand. Therefore, infantry attacks, unless backed by surprise, are an exceedingly costly venture. What is more, they are almost certainly doomed to failure [1]. The extremely harsh and inhospitable nature of the terrain was the reason for the Indian troops taking a ‘calculated risk’, leaving it unoccupied during winters, and returning at the advent of spring.

What are referred to as ‘roads’ in this mountainous terrain are usually tracks, which nevertheless can accommodate heavy traffic, including military vehicles. The tracks invariably run along valleys, in this case from Dras to Kargil fairly close to the heights. At Dras, the road curves right under the predominant heights, making the entire Main Supply Route (MSR) feeding the surrounding area (including Siachin) vulnerable to interdiction, even with small arms. Most valleys in the region range in span from a few hundred metres to a couple of thousand. At Dras the valley is at its widest, ranging between five to seven thousand metres, which enables it to house a small cantonment. It is from this cantonment that, at the advent of spring, troops return to occupy the heights they have vacated in winters.


MusharrafSometime around mid-November 1998, Lt Gen Mahmud, then commanding 10 Corps, sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Aziz. When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan. They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter. The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement. The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. Knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the four people present, for the time being.

It is useful to interrupt the sequence of events here, in order to draw a brief pen-picture of each of these four characters, as I know them. Doing so will provide a better understanding of the Pakistani adventure in Kargil, in which these characters played a prime role. Obviously, these will be incomplete, focusing essentially on the traits relevant to the events at Kargil. Equally obvious is the fact that the assessment of their characters is mine and, only as accurate as my knowledge of them, and my ability to assess another human being.

Gen. Pervez Musharaf: A sharp and intelligent artillery officer, he commanded infantry formations from brigade upwards, and held a large variety of staff and instructional appointments. A bold commander, who takes pride in being decisive, quick to take decisions and, therefore, a good commander of troops and keen to assume responsibility.

Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed: Again an artillery officer, with a wide variety of experience. He is sharp, intelligent and arrogant. So arrogant, in fact, that towards the end of his career it became overwhelming. A strong, forceful, decisive and highly ambitious individual, he was secular until he ‘discovered’ the force of Islam late in life. As a consequence, perhaps, he became dangerous in the way that anyone will become if they believe they are ‘incapable of doing wrong’.

Lt. Gen. Muhammed Aziz: More than anyone else, he has been painted the villain, and the ‘fundo’ (someone prepared to misinterpret religion in its puritanical form so as to justify acts of violence), which he is not. Deeply religious, but very balanced, he was born Kashmiri, and has served in some of the most rugged reaches of it at various stages of his career. He is strongly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of Kashmir, but not to the extent that it might jeopardize Pakistan. He is intelligent, sharp, very balanced, progressive and dynamic.

Major General Javed Hassan: A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he is more of an academic than a commander, and bears that reputation. He, therefore, was the only one with a point to prove.

While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December 1999, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif at some point in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the type of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. The military leadership had not presented a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, nor had they set out its political aim and how it would be achieved.

Colonel Sher KhanAt this stage the rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation (as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff [CAS] and the Chief of Naval Staff [CNS] too), and preparations proceeded in secret. The operation was, in my view, not intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, until finally they were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square kilometers over a front of over 100 kilometers, and a depth ranging between seven to fifteen kilometers. They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes. Whereas the total number of troops occupying these posts never exceeded 1000 (from all ranks), four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the operation. While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local Mujahideen assisting as labor to carry logistical requirements.

It was at this stage, in March 1999, that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfill a political objective. Given the fact that they were developing a plan to justify an operation already underway, the response was no less than brilliant. Given the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was about 2.25:1, [2] the MO concluded that the initial Indian reaction would be to rush in more troops to IHK, further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan [3]. It is for this reason that I maintain the view, which is held by no other analyst (to my knowledge) of this episode, that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possibility.

The political aim underpinning the operation was ‘to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir’. However, the military aim that preceded the political aim was ‘to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness’ [4]. The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant. The only flaw was that it had not catered for the ‘environment’ [5]. Quite clearly, it was an aberration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.

Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the prime minister in April, in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS was on a visit abroad, the navy’s reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war. He also voiced the view that in the event of war, the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might seek.

The Battle

Havaldar Lalik Jan ShaheedBy the third week of May, the Indian leadership began to have some idea of the extent of the penetration. They tempered their initial boastful claims of ousting the intruders in a matter of days, to weeks, then to months, and finally they expressed a hope that they might be able to evict them before the onset of winter, but were not sure of achieving even that. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had been taken to deny that the intrusion had been perpetrated by military troops, and instead put the lame on the Mujahideen. In the period up to the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays into the region and suffered heavy losses. At about this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, by using airpower. They also decided to bring in their 400 odd ‘Bofors guns’ [6]. In fact only about 170 were introduced, but these were destined to play a decisive role.

The inclusion of air power was not very successful. Within a few days, on 28 May, two MIGs were shot down by Pakistan. The following day Pakistan shot down two helicopters. The Indians’ lack of success had nothing to do with effort, but rather the nature of terrain, which ensured that bombing, had little chance of working unless it was laser-guided – the only kind that could be accurate in this terrain. Since this terrain also made it impossible for the Indians to put Troops on the ground, they tried using helicopters, which forced them to expose themselves.

Early in June the Bofors guns began to arrive. Since Dras was the locality where Indians were most vulnerable, they decided to start there. Deployment was possible because the great depth of the valley provided the necessary space. While only forty or so guns could be deployed here, they were sufficient. Under cover of fire, elements of 2 Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called ‘Tololing top’, (Point 4590) [7], the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras, on 12 June. An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June. Without in any way undermining the courage and determination of the Indian soldier, the deployment of the Bofors could not but result in the capture of these peaks (see Figure 1). But they could not effect the same military outcome in other places, merely due to the nature of the terrain, and the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors.

The Aftermath

nawaz_sharifNawaz Sharif, who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he characteristically made no effort to analyze this aspect. The international pressure was becoming unbearable and,when the posts at Dras fell, he began looking for an escape route, not appreciating the military causes of battle, which the army made no effort to explain. Sharif was very worried about the reaction of the military leadership, realizing that a withdrawal might result in his untimely ouster. He responded by dispatching his brother, Shahbaz Sharif to Washington, where he succeeded in getting the US administration to issue a warning that it would regard a military coup in Pakistan as unacceptable. Not only did this serve to warn the military leadership of the prime minister’s fears, it also shed some light on the possible course he might pursue later. The Indian leadership had been offering Sharif an ‘out’ – a statement by him that the Pakistani army had undertaken the operation without political sanction. Had Sharif accepted this offer in time, he might have survived (even though it would have made him look foolish). He lacked the political acumen, however. When he finally accepted the offer – after being forced from power – he found few believers.

During the last briefing in late June, the COAS, General Musharaf, told Sharif that, while the military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting Pakistani troops from the posts they were holding [8], the army would pull back if the government so desired. After some frantic telephone calls by Sharif to US President Clinton, in which he conveyed his desperation at the course of events, he went to Washington. He met Clinton on 4 July, and armed with guarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the ‘freedom fighters’ occupying Kargil.

Sharif was still apprehensive, however, and also uncertain of his ability to survive his decision to pull back. Had he been otherwise, things might have continued more or less as normal, and the Pakistani people may still be saddled with him. Instead, he began to call upon the COAS to proceed against the principal actors in this episode and get rid of them. He also convinced Mr Niaz Naik [9] to give an interview to the BBC stating that India and Pakistan had been working towards a peaceful solution of Kashmir, which was hijacked by Kargil. Musharaf resisted, believing that if heads were to roll, his would be the first. Sharif’s plot to get rid of him was unsuccessful, and the rest is history. Sharif was deposed and Musharaf assumed the mantle of leadership.

As indicated above, Pakistan’s first error of judgment was to undertake the operation at a juncture when the entire international community was bound to condemn it. Not only was the ‘Lahore process’ being viewed with hope, India had returned to the limelight in the US’s eyes and Vajpayee was just establishing himself in power. Kargil had the capacity for creating political chaos in India, which was the last thing the world wanted. If it had succeeded, the Advanis and George Fernandes’ would have been India’s future. This, in my judgment, would have meant disaster for everyone, including Pakistan. If Kargil had taken place a year earlier, the reaction might have been less adverse.

Kargil conflictAs if this were not enough, Pakistan decided, for some inexplicable reason, to disclaim responsibility for the incursion. Not only did this cause considerable politico-diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful assertions suspect. American intelligence had already confirmed a military presence there. Tapes obtained in Pakistan of a conversation between the COAS and the CGS during a trip to China added further confirmation. To top it off, Pakistan was giving away gallantry awards (including the highest military award in Pakistan) to soldiers who, we averred, were not fighting a war!

Nonetheless, having suffered the condemnation and the embarrassment of being caught in a blatant falsehood, if the planning of the complete operation was as meticulous as I understand it to have been, the leadership might have been better to allow it to run its course. The operation was, beyond any doubt, brilliantly planned. If the military leadership was convinced (and some of them managed to convince me) of the possibilities of its success, it might have been better to see it to its logical conclusion.

The military takeover was ‘written on the walls of Kargil’. Even if Sharif had succeeded in his endeavors to oust Musharaf, he could not have lasted. No political government could survive the sacking of two army chiefs [10] in one term in Pakistan – an unfortunate reality. It now appears that Pakistan will return to some sort of ‘controlled democracy’ (whatever that means), with Musharaf as the ultimate, untrammeled ‘check and balance’ to a puppet government, for a minimum of five years. His steps so far are appreciably in the right direction, but whether absolute power will corrupt absolutely, only time will tell. Even if it turns out for the best, the idea of democratic dictatorship is unpleasant. Yes, Kargil is an ongoing process, with the ultimate outcome still awaited.


1. The size of the feature dictates the number of soldiers it can accommodate: usually between four to twelve per post. The size of the approach to the top dictates the number of soldiers that can approach it abreast, typically between eight to twenty. Consequently, the battle is heavily weighted in favor of the defender.

2. It is generally accepted that the required ratio for a force launching an offensive to have chances of success is 3:1. However, in mountainous terrain the required ratio may be many times more. If the present total military capabilities (including quality, quantity, numbers, etc .) – were measured, I would support the estimate that MO came up with in

1999. However, this relationship is not permanent, and, given their proposed military spending, will undergo a drastic change in favor of India in a year or two.

3. While the general view was that nuclear deterrence was the cause of Indian restraint, I tend to agree with the conclusions of MO. It is my view that India toyed with the idea of an all out war in late May/early June, but the military leadership could not guarantee the defeat of Pakistan. Consequently, it was decided to confine the battle to this small chunk of territory.

4. My input on the subject is from a number of highly placed sources, on the condition of anonymity, during and immediately after the episode. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the words, but can vouch for the essence of the two statements.

5. At the National Defense College, while teaching operational planning, the first factor to be considered is ‘environment’. The word refers to the national and international dimensions, on the basis of which one can decide whether the political aim could be acceptably achieved, and if so, to develop a military plan that could succeed within the given environment.

6. Swedish made field howitzers, light and portable enough to be inducted into area.

7. Point heights indicate the height of the feature in meters.

8. The army had continued to assert that no posts had fallen to the Indians, which reaffirms the contention that no effort was made to explain such a loss, or why it could not recur. However, in this case, it appears that Sharif found the Indian claims more credible than the Pakistan army’s denials.

9. An ex-foreign secretary of Pakistan involved in ‘track two’ diplomacy with India.

10. In October 1998, Sharif sought and obtained the resignation of Gen Jehangir Karamat,then COAS, over a disagreement, when he publicly recommended the formation of a National Security Council.



Lt. General Shahid Aziz – a hypocrite and a liar

February 5, 2013

(Written by Zahid Hussain)

The recently-published memoirs of Lt. General (Retd) Shahid Aziz is more of an apology than an honest documentation of his life and time in the Army. At best, he comes across as a self-righteous retired general.  The voluminous and somewhat elegiac memoirs, titled  ‘Yeh Khamoshi Kaha Tak, Ek Spy Ki Dastan-e-Ishaq-o-Janoon,’ gives some insight into a twisted mindset of a man who was until recently a part of the highest echelon of the country’s national security establishment.

Shahid AzizHis narrative brings out a deeply conflicted and hypocritical worldview, though not uncommon among many of our retired senior military officers. It is all about self-aggrandizement of his religiosity and   uprightness that sounds a bit hollow, given the general’s past. His sympathy for the militants fighting the Army and who are found beheading Pakistani soldiers raises questions about his allegiance.

The general opposes the military campaign against insurgents in the tribal areas. Yet there is no criticism of militants who orchestrate the violence and suicide bombings that have killed thousands of innocent Pakistanis. He attributes terrorist violence entirely to the US and Western conspiracy to destabilize Pakistan.

The apologists of the Taliban often present such conspiracy theories, but this coming from a man who held important national security responsibilities is quite chilling.  The paranoia and the weird discourse that he puts across should give little confidence to Pakistanis about their national security apparatus.

He presents his own vision of an Islamic system devoid of democracy where pious and religious men will run the country. He brags a lot about his love for Islam and his piety. But he was not known to be as pious as he pretends to be in the Army. I recall seeing him in early 1999, soon after he joined the ISI, at a top businessman’s party in Islamabad whose salon was frequented by top military officials. He was obviously intoxicated—and believe me not by a soft drink. He was a regular guest at such parties.

The General sees most of Pakistan’s problems caused by its alliance with the US. But it was intriguing that many Western diplomats who I met in 2004 were anxious to see him promoted to the position of Vice Chief of the Army Staff. Coming from a military-family background, General Shahid Aziz held some pivotal positions during his career in the army spanning over 37 years. His rise to the top came after the 1999 military coup in which he played a critical role as Director General Military Operations (DGMO). He shows no remorse for the part he played in ousting an elected government. He considers democracy “a corrupt and un-Islamic system.”

The general’s contempt for the civilian rule was so strong that he considered resigning from the Army in mid-1990s because he felt humiliated that he saluted to the country’s elected Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. That says a lot about the mindset of a born-again Islamist general.  Such attitude towards the civilian leaders is not uncommon among other senior military officers. That also explains his role in the plot to overthrow an elected government a few years later. Shahid Aziz was appointed to the powerful position of the Chief of General Staff (CGS) soon after 9/11. It was the time when Pakistan was forced to abandon its longstanding support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and align with the US in the war on terror.

Several senior army commanders who opposed the turnaround in Pakistan’s policy were purged out by General Musharraf and the Army high- command was overhauled. Shahid Aziz benefitted from the reshuffle and was elevated as the CGS. This made him a critical cog in Pakistan military’s support to the US war in Afghanistan. It is obvious that he had the full confidence of General Musharraf who, by the way, is related to him. The pious general now wails over what he describes as Pakistan’s “betrayal of Taliban and support for infidels in spilling the blood of Muslims.”  He spends “restless nights and prays for forgiveness of Allah for his sins.” Obviously, he could not have stayed as the CGS for long if he had been critical of Pakistan’s cooperation with US.

The question is: why did he accept to become the CGS in the first place if he did not agree with the policy? Why was he not purged out as many did because they showed dissent to the policy? It sounds ludicrous that as the CGS he did not know about the bases that Pakistan had given to the US forces for logistical support. It seems bizarre when he narrates, quite dramatically, how he felt when a junior army officer told him about the US troops landing near Gwadar. If he was so piqued by it why did not he resign, one may ask. Not only did the ‘upright’ general stay on, but he also got the prized posting of the Corps Commander, Lahore. He remained part of the military hierarchy when the Pakistani troops were sent to the tribal areas. The operation was launched after Al Qaeda and other militant groups made the tribal areas as their base for attacks in Afghanistan. But the general now believes that the operation against the insurgents was part of the US conspiracy to pit “Muslims against Muslims.”

He fails to show any remorse for the terrorist attacks on innocent citizens and his former colleagues in uniform. The General reserves the most scathing attack for his former patron, General Musharraf. He accuses him of taking away Pakistan from the path of Islam and encouraging an “immoral Western culture.” He sees Musharraf’s enlightened moderation as part of a US conspiracy to subjugate Muslims culturally.  The paranoid general believes the media freedom in Pakistan serves US interests. Of course, it does not prevent him from frequently appearing on TV channels to air his twisted worldview. The writer is a senior journalist and author of two books on security and terrorism.

The author is a senior journalist and author and writes regularly for DAWN.



Kargil War controversy: Musharraf hits back at ‘imbalanced’ Shahid Aziz

January 31, 2013

Describing former Pakistan chief of army staff Lt. Gen. (retired) Shahid Aziz as an imbalanced personality who has indulged in uncalled for character assassination, former president and army chief General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, justifying the 1999 Kargil War, said there was absolutely no need to inform everyone about the operation.

File photo of Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf speaking during a news conference in RawalpindiRejecting the suggestion that he had willfully put a “tight lid” on details regarding the Kargil War operation when he he was Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Musharraf told the Express News show Kal Tak that former prime minister Nwaz Sharif was solely to blame for the defeat, though militarily it was a success in the sense that it completely exposed the Indian security establishment’s unpreparedness.

“If he (Sharif) had not visited the U.S., we would have conquered 300 square miles of India,” claimed Musharraf.

He described the Kargil operation as a localized one, where the exchange of fire was routine.

“Nawaz lost a political front which we had won militarily,” he added.

During the Kargil conflict of 1999, Aziz ran the Inter-Services Intelligence analysis wing.

“The prime consideration of such actions is security and secrecy, so the army leadership decides who is to be informed and when. As the operation progressed and the proper time arrived, a briefing of the corps commanders was also held,” Musharraf said.

The former president said that he was astonished by Lt. Gen. (retired) Aziz’s claim ten years later.

He said blaming the nation at this juncture of time, as Lt Gen (retd) Shahid has done, seems to be part of a conspiracy.



Pervez Musharraf With Jasmeen on Shahid Aziz & Kargil Issue

January 31, 2013

Musharraf on “Tonight with Jasmeen” further discussing how a military victory in Kargil was converted in to a political defeat by Nawaz Sharif.


Pervez Musharraf with Javed Chaudhry on Shahid Aziz & Kargil Issue

January 30, 2013

Pervez Musharraf on “Kal Tak with Javed Chaudhry” rejecting the claims of Gen. Shahid Aziz regarding the Kargil operation and character assassination of the Pakistan Military.


Pervez Musharraf’s interview with Waseem Badami on the Kargil

January 30, 2013

Musharraf with Waseem Badami of the talk show “11th Hour” revealing how a military victory in Kargil was converted in to a political defeat by Nawaz Sharif.


APML-Charge sheet against Nawaz Sharif’s corruption-Released to media

November 13, 2010


All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) strongly rejects PML-N’s charge sheet against Pervez Musharraf, declaring it frivolous and baseless. PML-N’s charge sheet is full of lies and is in fact a futile effort to divert attention from Nawaz Sharif’s misdeeds, his corruption, loot, plunder, nepotism, and economic turmoil during his tenures. For this he must be held accountable.

The following depicts PML-N’s performance:-


Nawaz Sharif and his cronies have always been working to plunder Pakistan’s wealth as their sole agenda. He expanded his business empire by misusing his authority as Chief Minister Punjab and Prime Minister Pakistan. And in order to gain financial benefits, he manipulated laws and changed policies. Likewise, in a bid to avoid accountability, the Nawaz Sharif Government amended “The Ehtasaab Act” and made it effective from “1990” instead of “1985” as proposed in the original text of the “Ehtasaab Act” prepared by the interim government of caretaker Prime Minister (Late) Mairaj Khalid (1996-97). And by bringing this change he cunningly saved his tenure of Chief Minister Punjab (1985-88) from accountability.

Despite all maneuvering following references were filed against the Sharifs:-

  1. Nawaz Sharif, Shahbaz Sharif and others misused official resources causing a loss to the national exchequer of Rs 620million by developing 1800 acres of land in Raiwind at state expense.
  2. Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif are accused of whitening black money during their first tenure (1990-93) and causing a loss of Rs 180 million to the national exchequer by evading income/wealth tax.
  3. Nawaz Sharif, Saif-ur-Rehman and others reduced import duty from 325% to 125% on import of luxury cars (BMW), causing a huge loss of Rs1.98 billion to the national exchequer.
  4. On the imposition of emergency and freezing of foreign currency accounts, Nawaz Sharif and Saif-ur-Rehman removed 11 billion US dollars from Pakistani Banks illegally. Without the consent of account holders, Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificates (FEBC) accounts were frozen and foreign exchange was misappropriated.
  5. Illegal appointments in Pakistan International Airlines (Nawaz Sharif and Saeed Mehdi).
  6. Abbotabad land purchase scam (Nawaz Sharif and Sardar Mehtab Abbasi).
  7. Availing bank loan for Ittefaq Foundries and Brothers Steel Mills without fulfilling legal requirements (Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif).
  8. Concealment of property in the US (Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif).
  9. Illegal appointments and promotions in Federal Investigation Agency (Nawaz Sharif).
  10. US wheat purchase scam (Nawaz Sharif and Syeda Abida Hussain).
  11. Murree land purchase scam (Nawaz Sharif and Saif-ur-Rehman)
  12. Tax evasion (Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif).
  13. Forging of passports and money laundering (Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Dar).
  14. Concealment of private helicopter purchase while filing assets’ detail (Nawaz Sharif).
  15. Favoring Kohinoor Energy Co, causing loss of Rs. 450 millions (Nawaz Sharif and Others).
  16. Illegal cash finance facility given to Brothers Sugar Mills (Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif).
  17. Bribe offered to ANP’s Senator Qazi Mohammad Anwer (Nawaz Sharif and Others).
  18. Hudaibiya Paper Mills Reference against Sharif brothers and Ishaq Dar.
  19. Illegally appointing Chairman Central Board of Revenue (Nawaz Sharif)
  20. Whitening of black money by amending laws (Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif). 
  21. Causing Rs. 35 billion loss by writing off/rescheduling bank loans (Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Dar).
  22. Bribing (late) Maulana Sattar Niazi from National Exchequer (Nawaz Sharif and Others).
  23. Plundering Rs. 200 million from Jahez and Baitul Maal funds (Nawaz Sharif & Others)
  24. Opening fictitious foreign currency accounts (Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Dar).
  25. Making 130 political appointments in federal departments (Nawaz Sharif).
  26. Relaxing export duty and rebate to transport sugar to India (Nawaz Sharif).
  27. Whitening of money through FEBC (Nawaz Sharif).
  28. Wealth Tax evasion (Nawaz Sharif).
  29. Concealment of facts to evade property tax (Nawaz Sharif).
  30. Withdrawal of case against Senator Islamuddin Sheikh (Nawaz Sharif, & Ishaq Dar).

The first tenure of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister in the year 1990 saw another reign of loot and plunder. During this period Mian Nawaz Shairf obtained loans amounting to more than Rs.614 billion from Banks through his influence against inadequate guarantees. According to the details of loans obtained by Sharifs include Rs.1556 million  for Ittefaq Foundries, Rs. 543 million for Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills, Rs.455 million for Mehran Ramzan Textile Mills, Rs.373 million for Ramzan Bukhsh Textile Mills, Rs.339 millions for Ch. Sugar Mills, Rs.226 millions for Ittefaq brothers, Rs. 205  million for Sandalbar Textile Mills, Rs.182 million for Hudaibiya Engineering Mills, Rs.153 million for Hamza Board Mills Ltd, Rs.134 million for Hudaibiya paper Mills, Rs.351 Million for Brothers Sugar Mills, Rs.174 million for Brothers Textile Mills, Rs.159 million for Brothers Steel Mills, Rs.623 million for Ramzan Sugar Mills, Rs. 191 million Khalid Siraj Textiles, Rs.313 million for Ittefaq Sugar Mills, Rs.164 million for Ittefaq Textile Mills, and Rs.239 million were obtained for Ittefaq Brothers. Due to the malpractice the national wealth was used for establishing personal empire while the country’s economy was facing disaster. This loan was equivalent to the total internal loan obtained by the government of Pakistan! These so called patriotic politicians ruthlessly plundered the national exchequer and used national wealth for personal financial gains. In addition money laundering worth billions of dollars through illegal means, wheat import scam, awarding motorway’s contract to an internationally black listed company, receiving heavy loans despite of being defaulter, secret businesses in UK (Evidence attached), Sugar mills in Kenya and four flats in the most expensive area of London and huge commissions in privatization of Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) are also a few “achievements” of Nawaz Sharif and family.


The Auditor General Report released in the year 1988-89 reported that Nawaz Sharif, misusing his authority as Chief Minister Punjab, issued directives which resulted into direct malpractice of Rs. 35 billion.

The report said that the Chief Minister Secretariat had been turned into a hub of corrupt practices and Nawaz Sharif used public money like an emperor that resulted into huge fiscal deficit of the province.

The Auditor General Report released in the year 1986-87 said that the then Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif had used Rs. 1200 million for malpractices in only one year.

Nawaz Sharif allotted 3000 precious Lahore Development Authority (LDA) plots among his favourites due to which the province suffered loss of billions of rupees.

Nawaz Sharif was the lead character of the Cooperative and Financial Institutions Scam, which deprived the retired employees, orphans, widows, and poor of their total assets amounting to Rs. 17 billion.

Nawaz Sharif released Rs. 1200 million from his discretionary grant in the year 1985-86 while Rs. 1895 million were released in 1986-87, Rs. 1899 million were used in 1987-88 while another Rs. 1887 million were distributed among his cronies.


Nawaz Sharif, Shahbaz Sharif and other party leaders practically share and proudly identify commonalities between PML-N and Taliban and they have very close ties and cordial relations with terrorists and banned terrorist outfits. In early 90s Nawaz Sharif received huge sums of money from Osama Bin Laden to overthrow former Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaheed Benazir Bhutto’s Government. Even now PML-N’s cabinet members and spokespersons are commonly seen hanging around with members of those banned outfits, reportedly involved in managing terrorist attacks on thousands of innocent Pakistanis including soldiers, police officials and members of other law enforcement agencies.

Due to compromising attitude of PML-N’s leadership and their mild will to fight against the menace of terrorism the members of law enforcement agencies are completely demoralized. That is one of the reasons that the investigations against terrorists are not carried out in a proper manner and proof against arrested terrorists usually is not available. Due to the incapability of the Punjab Government terrible terrorist attacks took place in the province including suicide attack on Police Training School Bedian Road, blast in Moon Market Lahore, car bomb blast in the Rescue 15 building, car bomb blast in F.I.A building, suicide attack on Munawan Police Training Center, Model Town link road bomb blast, suicide attack on Jamia Naemia, terrorist attack on Ahmedi’s worship places, blasts in Imam Bargahs including Karbla Gammay Shah and suicide bomb blasts in the sacred shrine of Hazrat Data Gunj Buksh along with many others. After these attacks PML-N has morally lost its right of government in Punjab.

Further, it was Shahbaz Sharif, who instead of showing courage and political and moral will to fight against the enemies of Pakistan, in his speech in Jamia Naemia Lahore, begged for mercy from the terrorists. He, in a very disgraceful manner, requested them not to attack Punjab as they are likeminded and standing on the same side. This statement of Shahbaz Sharif reflects his mindset !


Nawaz Sharif and Co. has always been involved in destabilizing the democratic system by one way or the other and did not even hesitate to take bribes to grab power. Lt. General (R) Naseerullah Babar, the former Interior Minister had disclosed in the National Assembly in 1994, that the ISI had disbursed money to purchase the loyalty of various right wing politicians, including that of Nawaz Sharif, in order to manipulate the 1990 elections, for the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI- Pakistan democratic alliance), and bring about the defeat of the PPP. As proof Lt. General (R) Naseerullah Babar, Lt. General (R) Asad Durrani and others have filed affidavits supported by copies of various documents. In Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s human rights petition (HRC 19/96) in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the former Chief of Army Staff Mirza Aslam Baig and the former Chief of the ISI and a banker concerning the criminal distribution of the people’s money for political purposes. The case is pending adjudication in the Supreme Court of Pakistan for the last 14 years.


Nawaz Sharif’s politics is based on the philosophy “lie repeatedly till it seems as the truth”. He has based his politics on deceit and lies. Nawaz Sharif and his “chellaz” believe in lying repeatedly and religiously follow their convictions in this regard. They are masters in the art of manipulation and alteration and use their wealth to achieve their goals. One example is enough to expose their hideous character. After conviction in the hijacking case, Nawaz Sharif and his family approached foreign friends who persuaded President Pervez Musharraf to have mercy and forgive them. Nawaz Sharif, Shahbaz Sharif  and family sought pardon and signed agreements including a commitment not to participate in politics for a period of  ten years but they kept lying and hid the existence of these agreements from the nation until the head of Saudi Arabian Secret Agency, Prince Miqran Bin Abdul Aziz and Prime Minister of Lebanon Mr. Saad Hariri’s unveiled the existence of these agreements and Ch. Nisar had to admit the existence of these agreements during the press conference of Javed Hashmi. Sharif brothers in return of Pervez Musharraf’s “Ehsaan” (generosity) have not only crossed all limits of hostility but also lied to the nation. Would Nawaz Sharif and his “chellaz” ever tender apology to the Pakistani Nation, for lying to them for so many years?      


Under the horrible times of Shahbaz Sharif’s Government the Punjab province has been virtually converted in to a “Badmaash” (rogue) province. Here police officials get involved in heinous and brutal criminal activities like one in Sialkot. The administration did not take any action against the shameful and atrocious lynching of two young brothers until the footage was telecast on electronic channels. It is believed that only in Gujranwala Division, where a brother of PML (N) MNA was deputed as head of police department, more than two hundred extra judicial killings have taken place.  The record shows that in Punjab, police force has been continuously used to harass and insult political rivals. An endless campaign of lodging false FIRs against political opponents has also been initiated. Use of brutal police force and baton-charge has become a routine. Every segment of society including journalists, doctors, teachers, students, nurses, Government employees, semi Government and private institutions and lawyers have faced the brutality of police while protesting for their demands.


It is a hard fact that poor governance & maladministration is trade mark of Sharif brothers. Shahbaz Sharif is an attention-seeker and likes to show off. For the sake of “cheap publicity” he has started calling himself “Khadam-e-Ala” but miserably failed to meet the challenges of governance and administration. It’s a harsh reality that during his tenure in Punjab all institutions deteriorated conspicuously. In order to achieve their motives, Sharifs always appoint their blue eyed personnel on key posts by completely ignoring merit. Almost all districts of Punjab are being run by grade 19 officers who are incapable hence a basic reason for poor governance. Due to his dictatorial approach Shahbaz Sharif himself heads 12 provincial ministries and he seldom holds cabinet meeting. He takes decisions over ruling, the cabinet. His obstinate behavior is the prime reason for the maladministration in the province. It would be just and appropriate to suggest that Sharifs have failed to establish a democratic spirit in their government and have completely overlooked the norms of democratic political setups.


In order to consolidate and attain more power, ‘the champion of democracy and independent judiciary’, Nawaz Sharif attacked every individual and institution, he felt could get in the way and challenge his authority. In order to get rid of Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, who Nawaz Sharif despised, the latter created divisions amongst the judges using the humble services of a former judge, Rafique Tarrar (later President of Pakistan) to make life difficult for the Chief Justice. A group of judges refused to acknowledge CJ Sajjad Ali Shah as the Chief Justice and things got so bad that a number of junior judges made it difficult for him to carry out his duties. Eventually, Sharif ordered his thugs to attack the Supreme Court in order to prevent the Chief Justice from giving a ruling against him.

The police did nothing to stop Sharif’s thugs as they attacked and entered the Supreme Court premises. The judges inside the building barely managed to escape. The thugs, led by Sajjad Naseem and Mushtaq Tahir Kheli, Nawaz Sharif’s political secretaries, entered the court chanting anti-CJ Sajjad slogans and destroyed the Court Room.


A number of incidents during 1998-99 indicated a pattern of harassment and intimidation of individual journalists as the government was increasingly becoming intolerant. Imtiaz Alam, a Lahore-based journalist, complains of threats over the telephone and then of his car being set on fire in a mysterious manner the next day. Another Lahore journalist, Mahmud Lodhi, was picked up and held in illegal custody for two days. He was questioned about his involvement with a BBC team filming a documentary on the rise and wealth of the Sharif family. Present Pakistani ambassador in USA Mr. Hussain Haqqani was picked up in a cloak-and-dagger fashion and interrogated at a FIA Center for money embezzlement while he held government office.

The residence of Idrees Bakhtiar, a senior staff reporter of monthly Herald and BBC correspondent in Karachi was raided by CIA police on Nov. 26, 1998. The police harassed the family and also arrested his 28-year old son, Moonis, who was later released.  On Feb. 13, 1999, three persons, including Senator Abdul Hayee Baloch and a lady worker from Lahore, were injured when the police baton-charged, used water cannons and threw  bricks on a peaceful procession of the Pakistan Awami Ittehad in front of the parliament house in Islamabad. The march, organized by the PAI for the freedom of the press, was led by PAI president Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (late), the then opposition leader Shaheed Benazir Bhutto and secretary general of the alliance Hamid Nasir Chatta, besides a number of sitting and former PPP MNAs and senators.

The owner of the Frontier Post, Rehmat Shah Afridi, was arrested in Lahore on April 2, 1999, by the Anti-narcotics Force. The Peshawar-based Frontier Post was critical of government policies. Afridi’s arrest was seen by journalists and others as another attempt to gag the Press. On May 8, 1999, Najam Sethi, Editor of The Friday Times, was arrested on the orders of Nawaz Sharif. Police stormed into his house in Lahore and dragged him out of his bed room. After brutal torture and breaking furniture of the house he was shifted to some unknown place. And before leaving the house with Mr. Sethi, they tied his wife Jugnoo’s hands with a rope and locked her up in a dressing room. Later, Nawaz Sharif asked COAS Gen. Musharraf to charge Mr. Sethi under the Pakistan Army Act for being a traitor and give him maximum punishment (maximum punishment is death!).

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a press freedom organization, said on June 1, 1999 that it was conducting an investigation into a “hit list” prepared by the Pakistan government that contains 35 prominent journalists of Pakistan. According to reports received by the CPJ, the federal government had decided to establish a special media cell comprising officials from the police, Intelligence Bureau and the Federal Investigation Agency to punish the journalists, who had been writing against the government. Ehtesab Bureau Chairman, Senator Saifur Rehman Khan was to head this cell which would function from Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar with its head office in Islamabad.

According to the CPJ, the journalists were: Irshad Ahmed Haqqani (late), Rehmat Ali Razi, Anjum Rasheed, (writer and anchor person) Suhail Warraich, Sohaib Marghoob and (late) Roman Ehsan (Jang Lahore), M. Ziauddin (Dawn Islamabad), Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Javed Jaidi, Nusrat Javeed, Mariana Babar and Ansaar Abbassi (The News, Islamabad), Rehana Hakeem and Zahid Hussain (Newsline), Ejaz Haider, Khalid Ahmed, Jugnu Mohsin and Adnan Adil (The Friday Times, Lahore), Mahmood Sham (Jang, Karachi), Rashed Rehman (The Nation, Lahore), Amir Ahmed Khan (Herald, Karachi), Imtiaz Aalam, Beena Sarwar, Shafiq Awan, Kamila Hyat and Amir Mir (The News Lahore), Abbas Athar (Nawa-e-Waqt, Lahore), Kamran Khan and Shehzad Amjad (The News Karachi), Azam Khalil (Pulse), Mohammad Malik (Tribune), Imtiaz Ahmed (The Frontier Post, Peshawar), Ilyas Chaudhry (Jang Rawalpindi), Naveed Meraj (The Frontier Post, Islamabad) and Syed Talat Hussain (The Nation, Islamabad).

The Government of Nawaz Sharif started a campaign against the Jang group in July 1998 when it refused to sack a number of journalists critical of Government policies. The government objected to the Jang group newspapers’ reporting about the law and order situation in the country and put a ban on advertisement. On August 13, a report was published about non-payment of Rs. 700 million to farmers by the sugar mills owned by the Nawaz Sharif family. Three days later, the government sent notices to Jang for non payment of taxes and the case was shifted to the Ehtesab cell. On September 27, 1998, the Government asked the Jang group not to publish a report of ‘The Observer London’ that Nawaz Sharif had siphoned off millions of rupees. The report was not published by the Jang but it was published by its sister English newspaper The News. On November 5, bank accounts of the Jang group were frozen and FIA raided the Jang and the News offices in Rawalpindi and customs authorities stopped delivery of newsprint to the Jang.

On Jan 28 1999, a sedition case was registered against Mir Shakil-ur-Rehman for publishing an advertisement of Muttahida’s Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation on January 1, which according to the police, was aimed at inciting people against the state.

Mir Shakil-ur-Rehman revealed that Senator Saif-ur-Rehman asked him to sack a number of Jang employees who should be replaced in consultation with the Government. He released to the press audio-tapes of conversation with Saif-ur-Rehman on this issue. Saif-ur-Rehman accused Mir Shakil-ur-Rehman for evading tax and customs duty to the tune of Rs. 2.6 billion.

The hostility of Sharifs towards media is also evident from the fact that in the parliamentary history of Pakistan for the first time a resolution, condemning the media, was tabled (by a group of MPAs belonging to Nawaz League) and passed in the Punjab Assembly.


There is probably no institution in Pakistan which Nawaz Sharif did not aggressively confront in order to make them comply with his wishes. Besides picking a fight with the President, the Judiciary and the restricted/limited media of that time, Sharif also decided to have a confrontation with the army, the only viable institution left in Pakistan. Due to his hostile and dumb approach in Nawaz Sharif’s first term as prime minister, he fell out with three successive army chiefs:  General Mirza Aslam Beg, General Asif Nawaz and General Abdul Waheed Kakar.  During his second tenure, he fell out with two other Generals, General Karamat and later with General Pervez Musharraf. General Karamat became the first Chief of Army Staff in the history of Pakistan to have been prematurely retired!

One by one all challenges and potential obstacles to his dictatorial mindset were removed from his way by Nawaz Sharif. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari, Sajjad Ali Shah, and General Jehangir Karamat were all removed from the scene by Nawaz Sharif.


Nawaz Sharif’s ill-considered economic decisions cost Pakistan dearly! But the Sharif family’s personal business empire grew exponentially through questionable means.

Nawaz Sharif, during his tenure as Chief Minister Punjab from 1988-90, deprived the provincial departments of Rs. 15.35 billion. In addition in 1997-99 he caused huge loss amounting in 11 billion US dollars to private account holders by freezing foreign currency accounts contrary to the law and constitution wherein he and his cronies managed to get away with huge sums even after the freeze. Billions of dollars were removed from the banks without the permission/consent of the account holders but the accounts of common Pakistanis were withheld.

In last two and half years, Shahbaz Sharif wasted more than 40 billion rupees in “Sasti Roti” and other subsidized food schemes that had been initiated to earn cheap popularity and to benefit their political supporters. Admittedly these funds have been distributed amongst their own supporters without any audit just to gain political mileage. A huge chunk of these funds has been disbursed by the ghost “Tandurs” (burners) owners. Inflation and un-employment is rocketing day by day due to the ill-conceived decisions of the provincial government. This is one of the reasons that Punjab could not help flood victims at the time because they had utilized their funds in senseless politically motivated schemes and now have an overdraft amounting Rs. 80 billion.


The so called son of soil Nawaz Sharif virtually sold Kashmir in 1999 during Indian PM’s visit to Lahore. Nawaz Sharif deleted the word Kashmir from the joint declaration to please Indian counterpart. By crossing all the limits of treachery and falsehood Nawaz Sharif and his cronies claim that Pakistan armed forces lost the Kargil war. In fact, due to the decisions of Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan lost this war in the drawing room of the American President after wining it in the battlefield.


It is a proven fact that in 1998 Nawaz Sharif was double-minded about the atomic explosions. While the nation waited breathlessly for a befitting reply to India, Nawaz Sharif was busy in negotiating economic packages with US Government. Gohar Ayub Khan, who was foreign minister at that time, has also corroborated this fact in his book.  


  • APML demands from the Government to immediately initiate proceedings on the pending references against Nawaz Sharif.
  • Nawaz Sharif and his Family must declare their assets both inside and outside Pakistan.
  • Nawaz Sharif must apologize from Pakistani nation for lying and hiding the existence of pardon and all other agreements that were formulated between him and Pervez Musharraf.
  • Nawaz Sharif Must tender apology for the heinous campaign against press and journalists and for the criminal attack on Supreme Court of Pakistan. 

Dear Friends! Politics is every body’s right and PML-N will have to face Pervez Musharraf politically. They cannot befool Pakistani public any more. We challenge them to bring their achievements and we will present ours. But knowing PML-N’s track record it seems they will lie again. We wish to seek our future from the People of Pakistan. Let the people decide.

Thanking you

Co-ordination Committee

All Pakistan Muslim League-APML


Nawaz amassed over $1bn ill-gotten money in London: Musharraf

November 10, 2010

NEW YORK: Former chief of the army staff Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf has accused PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif of having amassed over $1 billion in ill-gotten wealth. The money stashed in bank accounts in London is looked after by his son.

Addressing a gathering of Pakistanis at a New Jersey hotel, he asserted that if he returns to power he would try the Sharifs in court of law.

When asked by a person in the audience why had he been keeping quiet about the alleged corruption of President Asif Ali Zardari who also bilked the country of billion of dollars, the former COAS noted: “The PPP government was under fire and I do not want to put more pressure on it.”

The former army chief who ousted Mr Sharif in a coup in 1999 observed that “Nawaz Sharif will never be allowed to assume seat of power in Pakistan after his confrontation with the army in 1999.”

For the second time in two days he severely criticised Mr Sharif and said that after winning elections he would settle scores with him.

The former general rejected rumours about a split between his newly formed All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) and MQM. “We have no differences,” he said.

The organisers of the event kept journalists away from the retired general and did not allow them to ask any question.

Source: Dawn

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